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ABSTRACT 
There have been a number of studies catTied out that have tried to detetmine the long 
term perfonnance of IPOs. The three key issues these studies try and dwell on is the long 
run underperfonnance, short tenn w1derpricing and the hot issue market phenomena. The 
effects of the financial crisis of2007-2008 was felt strongly in America. However there 
were small ripple effects that spilled over in to countries like Kenya. The studies canied 
out with regard to the above three phenomena in relation to IPOs and post financial crisis 
period have been scanty and not entirely conclusive. This project will help the IPO 
literature, by providing proof on two of the three above mentioned anomalies. The study 
documented evidence supporting the undisputed underpricing of IPOs at the NSE as 
compared to the closing first day trading price of the IPOs. With respect to the first 
phenomena, which was the long run underperfonnance, the results are mixed in the sense 
that the study concludes that there is no visible regularity when computed against the 
market benchmarks. The study also proves through the use of wealth relatives that the 
IPOs are perfonning similarly to the market on their 5111 anniversary to the market. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background. 
The global fmancial crisis was technically caused due to a combination of debt and 
mortgage backed assets. Right after the Second World War, prices in the United States of 
America have been steadily rising, (statistics, 2014). In the mid-2000s, m01tgages worth 
billions of dollars were given to individuals with poor credit ratings at adjustable rates . 
Prodigious investment banks such as Bear Stems and Lehman brothers were in peril as 
they held large positions on the sub-prime mortgages . The situation got worse and 
Lelunan Brothers had to file for bankmptcy. Many fitms had to be bailed out while others 
needed a takeover. The largest insurance company (AIG) had succumbed to the fmancial 
crisis and sought for bail out while Merrill Lynch was taken over by banlc of Ametica. 
The effects were seen in the stock market. The industrial average for the Dow Jones fell 
by around 30% in the course of the following 2-3 weeks. 
It is tme that Aftican countries had not been severely affected by the Global Financial 
Crisis based on the fact that African markets did not hold many positions on the risky 
securities but they are tied to these foreign economies tluough trade deals. 
Kenya was exposed to the crisis due to the fact that most of its exp01ts such as tea, coffee 
and flowers are to countries that were affected by the crisis like the USA. The recession 
in 2008 in America and parts of north em Europe could have resulted in a reduction in the 
demand for Kenyan exports. There are many Kenyans who live in USA and Northem 
Europe and who send money back home. This money is assumed to be invested in the 
Kenyan market. The recession cut down the disposable income for the expats living 
abroad and hence the amount they sent would decline, reducing investment in the Kenyan 
economy. 
Capital requirements shape the future of a company. There are two common ways a firm 
can raise this capital to support expansion or even simply just to meet monetary demands 
in their ongoing projects. The two methods are acquiring debt and issuing shares 
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publicly. Now this does not mean that privately owned companies have no shareholders, 
but they are few and hence have a limited capability. Issuing an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO), seems like a logical idea for companies as it stands to make more capital with a 
diversified number of shareholders in which n01mally, not one single public shareholder 
has a controlling interest. Research findings have however indicated that using the net 
income approach a firm that is fully fmanced via debt is more likely to have a higher 
value than one with a full equity funding, (Durand, 1959). 
"Kenya is emerging as one of Africa's key growth centers with sound economic policies 
in place for future improvement" according to Diarietou Gaye, the World Bank's Country 
Director for Kenya (2015). This is attributed to the thousands of industries that support its 
economy every day. Many of these large companies have not issued out IPOs. 
The guide to listing on the NSE explains that there are three key reasons for getting 
listed. That is: 
1. To raise funds for expansion and growth without interest payments to lending 
institutions from which they would borrow a sum. 
u. To improve the liquidity of their securities 
m. To inform and market its products to the public . 
A company could enlist first using an IPO in which the general public could subscribe to 
the shares by Offer for Sale (OFS). OFS is either done using a fixed price or through 
tendering methodology. The shares could also be put up for private placement where key 
investors are first identified and shares are put aside for their investment. There may be 
shareholders in a ptivate company who wish to sell and buy more of the company shares. 
Enlisting provides a market for existing shareholders to conduct transactions using these 
shares. 
Most SMEs in Kenya start off as family owned businesses but shun away from the 
concept of listing on the NSE, (Waitathu, 20 15). There has been an increase in private 
equity funds over the years. Private equity is simply composed of funds and investors 
who are willing to invest in a company directly (Mwaniki, 2016). They are also used to 
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complete an acquisition or rather a buyout of a public company which directly results in 
the de listing of the company. The latest of these trends is happening with the listed stock 
of Marshalls. "Marshalls also owns 50 per cent of Associated Vehicle Assemblers located 
in Mombasa, Kenya's largest and most successful vehicle assemblers. The success of the 
company is based on the excellent reputation of its range of products for quality and 
reliability in the tough conditions of Africa. The strength of Marshalls' marque is allied 
to our unrivalled back-up service network. This means that in every class in which the 
company competes, our products are consistently the clear market leaders," as seen on 
their webpage. Marshalls is a subsidimy of the Marshall Group headquartered in 
Cambridge. Ptivate equity funds have deduced that it is easier to seek strategic investors 
for when they choose to divest from a selected company as they consider the process of 
listing as unnecessarily expensive. In a move to make listing more appealing the CMA 
reduced its licensing fees in March 2017. The new payment methodology states that 
companies have to pay a maximum Sh30 million when they seek an approval to go 
public, down fi·om 0.15 per cent of the total value of the offer (Anayanzwa, 2015). Kenya 
has seen a dry spell of IPOs in the last 15 years shown in a study canied out by the CMA. 
They claim that only eleven firms have been able to offer the public there shares in the 
last 15 years. Many of these firms also complained about over regulation, high licensing 
fees and the fact that the NSE was lmown for its bad publicity. The Chief Executive of 
NSE, Geoffrey Odundo claimed that the recent decision by the Govenunent to introduce 
capital gains tax also contributed to the reason why fitms were dismissing listing options. 
The eleven IPOs that were issued totaled of 15.54 billion shares offered to the public 
raising only KShs 73.28 billion. The eleven companies that did enlist are Mumias Sugar 
Company, Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen), ScanGroup, Eveready East 
Africa, Kenya Reinsurance Corporation (Kenya Re), Safaricom, Co-operative Bank of 
Kenya, Btitish American Investments Company (Britam), the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange itself, which self-listed in 2014, African Lakes and AccessKenya. The last two 
from the eleven delisted from the NSE in2003 and 2013 respectively. 
According to Juma (2016) there are six potential steps in the process of an IPO and they 
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are simply, 
1. Bank h.iring. The company has to hire an investment bank. The investment bank 
will then help the company to focus on the financial needs as well as the projected 
finances that are likely to be raised. 
2. Submitting documents to Nairobi Security Exchange. The NSE is the agency that 
is mandated with the regulation of stock trading as well stock exchanges in 
Kenya. The documents are meant to explain the business of the company, the 
risks that are prone to happen and how the company is going to protect the 
investors. 
3. Handing out the preliminary prospectus. This is a document that lists the 
estimated price range for one share of the comp<tny' s stock. 
4. Going on a road show. This is now making the interests and the intentions of the 
company to go public !mown to the potential investors. Most companies, 
however, instead of going on a road show, they use the media to reach out to 
potential investors. 
5. The agency mandated with the regulations of the stocks makes the statement 
public and gives a go ahead for the purchases to be made. 
Jumba (2002), noted that there was a problem with the long tenn perfonnance of the 
stock for a company as they tend to perfom1 poorly. His study reveals that the retums for 
the sample he chose of9listed companies in NSE from1992-2000 was a mere 0.06% for 
the first tlu·ee years after the company decides to go public. 
1.2 Problem Statement. 
Initially this study was undertaken to establish whether or not there was underpricing of 
the shares when initially offered to the public and the long tem1 under or over 
performance of these IPOs listed on the NSE. Ndatimana (2008) dealt with tlus problem 
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regarding securities issued during the years up to 2008. He was building on what Jumba 
(2002) had worked on by including a bigger sample and using more statistical 
methodology. However, there is a gap regarding the effects the Financial Crisis has had 
on the Kenyan Stock Markets, with little to no developments seen in the recent years. 
While this study builds on what Ndatimana, (2008) did by using the Market Adjusted 
Buy and Hold retums methodology, this study will use a more recent sample of 
companies ranging from 2008-2016. In contrast Ndatimana used a sample of 15 
companies from 1992-2007. The idea of using less companies but more recent ones is 
that the economic environment has changed recently with respect to investment in shares. 
Back when Ndatimana (2008) did his research the financial crisis of 2008-2009 was not 
taken into account. The fmancial crisis confounded with the 2007-8 post election 
violence in Kenya had an immediate effect on Kenya's currency where the shilling 
depreciated by 3%-9% in a span of one month relative to the dollar, (McConnick, 2008). 
This event happened right after the post-election violence of2007. Kenya was taking on 
hits and it would be safe to assume that these affected the stock market. Fmihennore it 
was observed that during this period of the fmancial crisis the stock markets in North 
America, Europe and most of the Asia pacific region had fallen by over 30% since the 
start of 2008. Companies in East African countries also took a hit in the value of their 
stock as the stock markets fell by 27% in Kenya and 21% in Uganda between September 
1 and November 30, (Wanjohi, 2011 ). Also from looking at the eleven companies that 
did Issue out shares in the last 15 years we can notice how they lie on extremes. 
This study examines performance of companies based on five year period to get an 
understanding on whether the public issuing of shares benefits the long tenn perf01mance 
of these companies. 
1.3 Research Objective. 
1. To determine whether the IPOs listed on the NSE are underpriced or overpriced-:-
2. To evaluate the tlu·ee to five year performance ofiPOs in Kenya from 2008-2016 
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(post financial crisis). 
1.4 Research Questions. 
1. How do companies perfonn financially in the first five years after their first IPO 
post 2008 fmancial crisis? 
2. Are companies listed on the NSE, post financial crisis, underpriced or overpriced 
with their hlitial offerings? 
1.5 Significance of the study. 
This study adds on to the knowledge in the scholastic conunmlity on understanding the 
perfonnance of IPOs in Kenya by considering a period of high volatility in 2007-08 
which witnessed the global financial crisis and Kenya's Post-election violence. 
This study will help investors willing and able to invest in the NSE listed companies with 
a guideline on the long tenn perfom1ance of the stock and the effects of the financial 
crisis on their long term performance and hence investors will be able to make a rational 
decision. 
Likewise, regulatory authmities shall benefit from this paper as they shall be able to 
deduce the perfonnance of IPOs in Kenya, their success rates and the effects global 
financial ctisis has on the stock exchange. This is also true for brokers and undetwriters. 
The regulatory authorities will also benefit by better understanding the cause of 
inefficiency in the market. 
Companies who have not listed on the NSE can also benefit from this paper seeing the 
benefits or disadvantages of listing on the NSE,. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review. 
2.1 The Advantages and Disadvantages oflssuing Shares to the Public. 
In the 1998 article in the joumal of finance by Pagano, Parmeta, & Zingales (1998), there 
were benefits and costs of listing on the stock exchange that were clearly explained as 
follows : 
2.1.1 The benefits of Issuing Shares to the Public. 
The most obvious advantage one would be able to think was the fact that the company 
finds itself an altemative to borrowing. Tlus is extremely advantageous to companies that 
have plans of expansion and will have a high capital need in the future. This is a simple 
way to get an alternative to bank boiTowing and high interest rates. This was one of the 
advantages stated that by Pagano et al (1998). The second advantage that was stated in 
their paper was that companies would choose to go public in order to increase their 
bargaining power with banks. They simply predicted that the companies facing a higher 
interest rate have few sources from which they can obtain credit, the compames will be 
more willing to go public with the exception of credit becoming cheaper. You see by 
penetrating the stock market and allowing for free flow of infonnation to the public a 
fum can extract completion from outside sources and this in tum will lead to a lower cost 
of credit and in some cases a larger supply of extemal finance. Thirdly we have the added 
advantage of liquidity and portfolio diversification. Going public has a definitive effect 
on the liquidity of a finn . The scope for diversification is also affected by the decision to 
go public. They clearly state that shares of p1ivate companies will be traded at a 
substantial cost for the party initiating the sale of shares. However trading of stock on an 
organized platform is cheaper and the shares can be traded at shmi notice. For initial 
owners who raise the capital from dispersed owners there is the factor of the liquidity 
benefit provided by being listed on an exchange platfonn. Another key advantage 
(Pagano et al, 1998) documented in their article was the benefit of mmutoring. The 
shareholders of a company (public), will use the data and information they derive from 
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the changing stock prices to create and modify a package of compensation schemes for 
managers, like offering them stock options. There was also the idea of investor 
recognition. In this theory Pagano claims that most investors have a small fraction of 
known company stock in their portfolio. They tend to have shares of companies mostly 
listed on the stock exchanges. Therefore getting listed on an exchange allows a company 
to attain recognition and could be used as a marketing strategy. Companies have the 
option to list on an exchange to change control. Owners can decide to go public to 
maximize value before they eventually sell the company off. "By going public, the initial 
owner can change the proportion of cash flow rights and control rights which he retains 
when he bargains with a potential buyer, Pagano et al (1998). The last benefit that was 
explained in this paper was the window of opportunity argument. If companies find out 
tlu-ough their analysis that stocks of its listed competitors are overvalued, they will want 
to benefit from this overpricing and may take this inf01mation as an incentive to list. 
2.1.2 The disadvantages of going public. 
There is the cost of adverse selection that is faced by many companies. The issuers tmly 
know the value of the company based on the infotmation each of them have. This 
information asymmetry has an overall effect on the quality of the firm which is seeking to 
list and therefore also affects the price at which the share will be sold which in tum leads 
to deciding the enonnity of the underpricing needed to sell these shares. It was noticed 
that companies that were smaller in size and relatively newer were less lmown to 
investors and this lack of infom1ation will affect the average quality of a company willing 
to go public and tllis forces their hand in determining share prices to make it attractive to 
these investors, tllis shows a con-elation between the probability of an IPO and the fmn 
size, (Chun, Lynch, & Smith, 2002) . We explained in the introduction how fitms tend to 
take on more debt instead of issuing an IPO due to the high administrative expenses and 
fees . This is echoed by Pagano et al (1998). There are considerable costs related to going 
public which seems an irrelevant cost to the firm . Some of these costs are the costs of 
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underwriting, registration, audit fees, stock exchange fees, certification and the cost of 
making public the accounting inf01mation. During their study, Chun et al (2002), noted 
that these costs were significant and certainly tumed away many firms from going public. 
IPO costs in Korea were typically 3% of their gross proceeds and tlus figure increased to 
7% when the study was carried out in America. However one of the biggest costs that 
fitms faced was the loss of confidentiality. Pagano et al. (1998) noted that firms would be 
hesitant to go public as they may have to reveal information which they believed was a 
secret that wasn't ready to be out in the open just yet like ongoing research and 
development programs. They also noted that with all the infonnation out in the open, 
these firms were under a scrutiny from the tax authorities making it difficult to reduce 
their scope for tax elusion. 
2.2 Money Left on the Table. 
Money left on the table is defined as the difference between the closing ptice on the first 
day and the price the share was offered at, multiplied by the number of shares sold dming 
that time, (Ritter, 2004). In short it is just the profit made during the first day transactions 
of these shares by the investors. You could say it is the transfer of wealth fi·om the 
original shareholders of the finn issuing the shares to the new investors. 
The irutial price offered for the IPO has a !ugh implication on the result of the offering. It 
is easy to see that if the price is too high, the interest fi·om potential buyers will subdue 
and this will lead to the failing of the offeting. On the other extreme is the effect if the 
price is set too low. With a low ptice there is going to be oversubscription which would 
mean from the above definition that the finn is leaving "cash on the table," that it could 
have probably collected if they had decided to go and charge a slightly higher price. At 
this low price the scheme to disttibute and allocate the stock is in effect giving out a 
higher surplus value from its offering. 
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Using Kenya Aitways (KQ) as an example to explain this further. When the market 
closed on April19111 , 1996, KQ had an oversubscription level of94% ofthe shares offered 
during that time which were 235 million shares. The trading price was 11 .25 shilling per 
share. When the ptice was checked for the first day traded closing ptice it was revealed 
that it was 13 .90 shilling per share. Plugging this infonnation in the fonnula shown by 
Ritter,(13.90- 11.25) * 235million we notice that KQ left 623 million shillings on the 
table due to this over subsctiption. 
2.3 Why IPOs tend to be underpriced. 
It was shown by Ritter (1991) that once IPOs are issued they tend to underperform other 
non-issuers in the long te1111 within the same economic sector with market value that 
equals the IPOs issuers. What was deduced from this paper is that the time to place or 
propose an IPO is not random but is based on the best time for that company in the 
market. 
Ritter later teamed up with Loughran, (Loughran & Ritter, 1995) and compared two 
portfolios using the method he desctibed as the wealth relatives . This was simply the 
ratio between the buy and the hold IPO potifolio, and a buy and hold non-issuers 
portfolio retums based on the same time horizon. They took in relevant infom1ation one 
year after the IPO was issued and estimated that there was a 0.9 wealth relative factor. 
Which according to his calculation resulted in a negative abnom1al retum. They replaced 
the non-issuers portfolio with the S&Ps 500 index the results were still the same. They 
then decided to perfonn this over a longer period, 5 years. The results stayed the same 
and abnotmal retums stayed negative. 
A study can·ied out, (Evans, 2000), took a sample of 1011 USA finns which were able to 
list on the stock market between the years 1994-1995. The study eventually revealed that 
that these fmns were able to underperfonn the market for at least tlu·ee years following 
their IPO. Thomas was able to deduce that the long mn retums are have a significant 
relationship to a number of key factors , namely, the first day retums, the reputation of the 
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underwriter, the return from the market prior to the IPO and ownership through venture 
capital. 
There exists a high level of conelation between the returns on the stock markets in an 
emerging country and that of developed countries. Based on this fact the effect the 
financial c1isis had on the Dow Jones must reflect on to other stock markets around the 
world too. An examination of 14 countries that were still considered as emerging 
countries proved that the crisis in USA significantly affected the markets in the emerging 
countries, (Cuadro-Saez, Fratzscher, & Thimatm, 2009). 
The crisis has affected Kenya and other African counh·ies from both direct and indirect 
channels. In essence the direct channels is the financial markets. There has been an 
i1mninent increase in the variance of the stocks as well as relative wealth losses. There 
has been a significant decline in the stock market indices in Nigeria of around 67% 
between 2008 and 2009. Nigeria is one of the most affected counhies in Africa to the 
financial crisis due to the effect the c1isis had on its oil sales. 
Looking at Kenya which has a growing stock market it was necessary to take into 
consideration what was proposed by Chun et al (2002) when Korea was going through a 
similar process of an emerging stock market. What they noticed here was that there was 
less attention paid to this stock market as more of the resources and attention were 
focused towards the banking sector and the market for bonds. There is also evidence that 
most studies done in the stock market are done in the secondary market. 
There were many theo1ies and hypothesis explained by Ritter (1998) on the aspect of why 
IPOs tend to be underpriced. Some of these theories which were relevant are explained 
below: 
2.3.1 The Bandwagon Hypothesis 
In this theory it is explained by Ritter (1998) that new investors take in to consideration 
actions from other investors before they decide to buy securities. If investors tend to 
make decisions sequentially then other investors tend mimic the previous investors 
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decisions. What fitms do to take advantage of this phenomena is that they deliberately 
undervalue its shares. This will capture the attention of the investors, leading to a good 
first impression which then tends to create a ripple effect by attracting other new 
investors. 
2.3.2 The Investment Bankers Monopsony Power hypothesis 
It is a known fact that investment bankers tend to have a good understanding of how the 
stock market is supposed to work. This hypothesis is based around this fact. The 
hypothesis goes to state that the investment bankers use their understanding of the market 
and the company issuing the shares to underprice this offering, (Ritter J. R., 1998). It 
allows them to spend less time marketing the shares as the price should speak for itself 
and they then ingratiate themselves with the buy-side customers. 
2.3.3 The winners curse hypothesis. 
One of the most popular hypothesis regarding the underpticing phenomena. When the 
information asymmetry aspect is present in the market investors tend to use tllis to their 
advantage. With infonnation asymmetry, Ritter (1998) suggests that if an irutial issue is 
deduced to be underpriced, investors will buy more shares which in tums increases 
demand which in tum results in newer investors being issued only a small portion of the 
new desirable issues and more of the less desirable ones. These investors will be awarded 
all the shares which they request for only because the more infonned investors have 
rejected these shares. Due to this adverse selection dilemma, the investors who tend to 
have less inf01mation will only place a bid order if on average the initial public offering 
is underpticed just enough to reward them for the bias they faced in the allocation of the 
new Issues. 
2.3.4 The lawsuit avoidance hypothesis. 
This theory revolves around the aspect of litigation. It theorizes that the underpricing 
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phenomena will reduce the occurrence of lawsuits and litigation, (Ritter, 1998). It is safe 
to assume that disheartened parties are more likely to sue if the offering was over-priced 
rather than underpriced. When issuing a prospectus all pmties are legally liable for any 
omissions they make that the law believes to be material. The underpricing is one way of 
reducing the frequency and severity of lawsuits. 
2.3.5 The Market Incompleteness Hypothesis. 
The hypothesis pushes the idea that markets that are seen to be incomplete should punish 
new comers rather than the already listed companies . Therefore investors ask for a 
premium for holding these new stock as a guarantee instead of investing in an already 
established listed company, hence the IPOs tend to be underpriced to allow room for the 
premium, (Ritter, 1998). 
2.3.6 The signaling hypothesis. 
Management of the issuers fim1 tends to have a huge value of reference for that fi1m. 
They use underpricing to show this value over time. In most cases they tend to issue a 
second public offering to recover from the initial underprice, (Ritter, 1998) . 
2.4 The IPO Process in Kenya. 
Securities can be brought to a listing using three main ways in Kenya: 
1. Introduction- To facilitate a market for cun·ent shareholders 
2. Private placement- The stock is out for sale to an identified set of investors. 
3. Initial Public offe1ing- The public in general is invited to partake in the buying of 
the shares. 
A budget of around 5-10% of the total value of the securities needs to be set aside by a 
prospective issuer, for costs ranging from publicity to printing costs, according to the 
practical guide by NSE. These costs though are normally tax deductible. 
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However it is not that simple to list on the exchange. There are legal and market 
requirements that need to be met. The company should be registered under the companies 
act and the financial records should be available and reliable with no qualifications in the 
independent auditors rep01t. It is also a requirement that the company's shareholding, 
management and core business activities remain relatively unchanged. The law also 
requires that the securities must be freely transferable with no restriction on marketability 
or the rights of pre-emption. There is a requirement by CMA that one class of voting 
shares that are on the exchange (listed) must have their prospectus or infonnation 
memoranda approved by CMA. It is also necessmy that only those shares that have been 
paid for fully are listed and that the company has not breached any of its loan agreements. 
There are certain expectations from the market regarding the issuer. It expects that the 
firm has a consistent and feasible market plan alongside a vast range of experience and 
knowledge in the board of directors who will represent the shareholders and the 
management team which will be in charge of the day to day business activities. The 
market most definitely expects the finn to make consistent profits. The finn must be 
transparent in ownership and in its activities and market sentiments and timing should be 
taken into consideration by the issuer. 
2.5 Valuing IPOs 
It is stated that valuation of IPOs should be no different than valuation of other stock, 
(Ritter, 1998). The discounting cash flow analysis (DCF) and the comparable firm 
analysis is a conunon tool used in the valuation of shares and can be used to value IPOs 
too. However a preliminary valuation may be dependent on the value of firms that are 
similar to the issuer. In most cases we could find a publicly listed company to compare 
with a new IPO, say if Airtel Kenya decided to list on the NSE we could use the 
infonnation on how customers value Safaricom to value the initial price offering for 
Airtel Kenya. However using DCF analysis to value stock is based on many sensitive 
assumptions made by the analyst, this would explain why fair value may not always 
reflect the forecasts. DCF is also more time intensive compared to other methodologies. 
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DCF also assumes that the company is 100% transparent with all its reporting which is a 
serious assumption that could alter the forecast of the future perfonnance. 
"Book building is when the lead investment banker canvasses potential buyers and 
records who is interested in buying how much and at what price", (Ritter J. R., 1998). In 
sununary the investment banker analyses the demand of the listing and constmcts a 
demand curve. They then price the initial offering on this information. When a fim1 
adopts the book building valuation, they nonnally hold off valuing the IPO until the 
moming in which the SEC clears the finn for going public in the USA. There is still 
problems with book building as it allows for shares to be allocated preferentially. The 
book building process tends to hand over a significant amount of control to the 
underwriter regarding the allocation of shares . 
Due to the privatization bill of 2005 that had been in the works for "nearly three years," 
many fim1s in the teleconununication, finance and energy and infrastmcture sectors were 
bound to be p1ivatized in the coming future. The bill reveals methods of privatization that 
consist of leases, concessions and management contracts, liquidation and negotiated asset 
sales. However at the same time The Financial Weekly, a newspaper, noted that public 
offering on the NSE may be more favorable as we have seen now with Kengen and 
Kenya Power. The key here by the Kenyan govemment was divesture which was 
achieved by increasing the ownership base for the Kenyan public. 
When trying to value a company, one has to analyze the sector of the economy the firm 
belongs in alongside its recent perfom1ance, strategic plan, its growth potential and the 
management record . However the value of a fim1 yet to be p1ivatized is unpredictable. 
2 .6 The Hot Issue Market. 
This phenomena is what we call to define an event where we notice a period of abnormal 
initial retums and increasing volumes. It was noted, that fin11S which went public during 
"hot markets" underperfonned dramatically in comparison to other times, (Louglu-an & 
Ritter, 1995), (Ritter J., 1991). This brings in the concept of"windows of opportunity." 
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Companies will try and time their issues to coincide with these opportunities when they 
regard the valuation in the market is at its peak. The windows of opportunity concept will 
be dealt with as this paper goes on. 
2.7 Long-term Performance. 
It is obvious why investors are concemed with the long term performance of shares, by 
identifying pattems in the price changes investors have the chance to gain higher retums 
by partaking in an active trading strategy. It also helps to analyze the long term 
performance to try and identify if there was a "nonzero aftermarket performance" in 
order to check the efficiency of the primary market. (Ritter, 1991) also noted that the cost 
incmTed by a company going public depended not only on the transaction costs of going 
public but also on the retums the investors would receive in the aftem1arket. This was an 
important factor to the extent that if low retums were eamed in this aftennarket then the 
cost of equity was lowered for these fmns. Lastly it also noted that there was a large 
variation in the volumes ofiPOs over time (Ritter, 1991). Once again the window of 
opportunity phenomena is relevant here. If the periods in which there are high volumes of 
IPOs traded is linked to a poor long term performance then it would mean that investors 
are timing the IPOs to reap the benefits of the windows of opportunity. 
In theory it has been noted that the superior reh1ms generated are high during the start of 
the IPO but tend to be negative in the long tem1, (Ndatimana, 2008). It was discovered 
that for a sample ofUSA companies who issued IPOs during the period of 1960-69 there 
was a negative relation between the long term stock price performance and initial retums 
for the IPO, (Ibbotson, 1975) . When Ibbotson did cmTy out this stt1dy he noticed that in 
the first year there was a notably encouraging perfonnance by the stock. This was 
followed by a tum of negative perfonnance for the following three years and a peak again 
to a positive performance in the fifth year. 
In his study (Ritter, 1998) came to a realization that companies that went public between 
the years of 1970-93 achieved a mean reh1m of around 7.9% every year for the first five 
years after the initial offering. He assumed that the first day closing market price was the 
purchase price for that equity. In contrast was finns that did not go public chosen on their 
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market capitalization basis produced a mean retum of just around 13 .1 %. He concluded 
that IPOs underperfonned by almost 5.2% in comparison to non-issuing firms. He also 
observed that most of the finns that did underperfonn were those that went public in 
years where heavy volumes of IPOs were traded and were relatively new finns. 
Established firms and firms that went public in years when the volumes were low tended 
not to underperfonn in the long mn. 
There have been three theories proposed to explain tllis long term underperformance 
events. The theories are explained below. 
2.7.1 The Impresario Hypothesis. 
It has been argued that there is a curtain of fads that smmunds the IPO market. There is a 
belief that IPOs are underpriced by the underwritets in a bid to make the offering more 
inviting to the public by creating a false image of excessive demand, (Slllller, 1990). This 
theory goes on to claim that firms that have a higher initial returns often end up with 
aftem1arlcet returns that are not as impressive. Shiller (1990) argued that investment 
bankers tend to create a fayade of demand surplus but the market tends to coiTect itself in 
the long term. There was some relation shown when Ritter (1991) caiTied out his study. 
However there has also been evidence suggesting that the initial return is not generally a 
significant factor in the explanation of long mn retum, (Jong-Wan, 2001) 
2.7.2 Divergence of Opinion. 
This theory argues that if there is a great amount of uncertainty surrounding the tme · 
value of an IPO then those investors who are optimistic will value the IPO higher than the 
pessimistic ones. However with the passing of time these two views of pessimism and 
optimism will naiTow down and eventually the market price will drop. This is based on 
the fact that the optimistic buyers are the ones who are eventually going to invest in the 
initial offering, (Miller, 1977). However this hypothesis is seemingly untested even 
though it's appealing. It is a tough task to measure the dispersion of beliefs across all the 
potential investors. 
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2.7.3 The Window of Opportunity. 
In this hypothesis it was argued by Ritter ( 1991 ), that in the periods where buyers are 
hopeful regarding the potential of the finns willing to go public, the huge cycles in 
volumes could be a representation of the companies trying to time their initial offering to 
benefit from these changes in investor behaviors. As mentioned earlier tllis hypothesis 
stresses the fact that the companies that tend to go public during periods of high volumes 
are more often than not overvalued. This statement could be interpreted to mean that 
these finns will in retum have a low long tenn retum. 
Regardless of the fact that there have been a number of studies conducted on financial 
crises, there has been no consensus on the causes of the financial crisis. There is also no 
globally accepted methodology to tackle and end a crisis nor is there any universally 
accepted list of effects the financial crisis has on the financial markets around the world. 
There is still a lot of research that needs to be undertaken considering the financial crisis 
phenomena. The research won't be a problem based on the fact that there will be 
financial crises from here to etenlity, (Pareto, 1964). 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Research design. 
This study is analytically designed to observe whether or not the pricing abnonnalities 
noted in many developed countries regarding IPOs exist in the Nairobi Stock Exchange. 
3.2 Population and sample. 
The population of the study is all companies listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange that 
issued an IPO after 2008. There are 68 listed companies on NSE as of May 2017. This 
companies include NSE itself as well as an exchange traded fund by the name of New 
Gold Issuer (RP) Ltd. From all these companies listed, all those that issued IPOs after 
2008 are to be studied. The number of companies that listed on the NSE post crisis are 3, 
and these 3 companies define the population. The sample in this scenario will be the 
whole population, where the population is all companies who went public after 2008-
2016. 
3.3 Data collection. 
Tllis study will revolve around secondary data collection methods. Stock process 
infonnation for the companies will be gathered for the period under study. That is the 
offer price and after market prices available on a daily basis on the NSE database. Key 
information relevant to this study will be found in the prospectus of issuing firms 
regarding the offer price and number of shares initially offered as well as a brief history 
of the finn. 
We use the standard event study methodology to analyze the medium to long term 
perfonnance of the IPO. An event study methodology is useful here as we tty to 
understand the magnitude and perceived effects an unanticipated even like the crisis can 
have on the stock market. Event studies have previously been used to conduct similar 
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studies like done by Ritter (1991 ). An event study can be undertaken for short tenn 
periods like 2 days, 2 months, or even in long term effects like a study for 60 months, 
(Sitthipongpanich, 2011). For a single IPO the monthly retums are computed for at least 
the first 60 months after the IPO is issued, this excludes the month of the issue. However 
there are problems that arise due smTotmd event studies with respect to IPOs. The biggest 
challenge is that enough data is not available to attain estimates of the benclunark 
variables in the time before the IPO was issued, (Ibbotson, 1975). 
Important to an event study is its control periods. These periods lay out what is 
considered as normal retums. The financial crisis was an event outside the control of the 
fitms issuing IPOs and this will affect the future operations in some way. Critical to an 
event study is its horizon. Typically with efficient markets, event studies focus on short 
tetm horizons. However there are even studies undertaken up to 5 years after the event 
has occmTed, this is known as a long tetm horizon. Teclmically short tenn studies focus 
on how fast infonnation is incorporated into the share prices however long tenn hotizon 
studies can focus on the infonnation incorporation and inefficiency as well as different 
expected returns. 
In the time line above TO-T1 will represent the estimation period. This is the period that 
shows a finns 'normal' retums over a period of time. The study aims to analyze this data 
from the prospectus that each finn releases before going public. This will involve data 
before and after the financial crisis hence we can estimate what nonnal retums are. 
The time period Tl-T2 will be the event window, whereas '0' is the time the event, in 
this case the issue of the IPO. Now we can see that time 0 falls in between T1 and T2 and 
yet the whole ofT1-T2 is the event window. This is because infonnation about the event 
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is already circulating in the market and affecting the market. Again this information will 
be available in the news. Now what we are again interested in in the time period T2-T3 , 
the post event window. This is after the IPO has been issued and is the pe1iod to 
detennine whether its long tenn perfonnance is nonnal or abnonnal and whether it had 
been underpriced or not. 
3.3.1 Market Adjusted Abnormal Return (MAAR) 
This methodology is conunon in use and hence was the first choice in this paper to 
detennine the existence ofunderp1icing ofiPOs in the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The 
research aims to calculate first the percentage change from offer p1ice to aftermarket 
prices for the sample companies selected. 
Since the paper focuses on the NSE, the study assumed NSE 20 as a benchmark. The 
study intends to calculate the MAAR of each of the finns selected using the NSE 20 
share index as the benclm1ark using the methods employed by (Aggarwal, Leal, & 
Hernandez, 1993). 
To calculate the return ofthe stock on the first day we employ the following formula: 
R 




Here Rn is the total day return of that share, Pw is the offering price for the IPO and Pn 
is the closing price of the share on its first trading day. 
To calculate the benchmark, which is the NSE 20 index return during the same time is 
R - PNSEl 1 (2) 
NS£1 - PNSEO -
Here RNsn is the first days NSE 20 retum that'll be compared to the others, PNsEo is the 
closing NSE 20 share index value of the appropriate share and PNs£1 is the closing value 
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of the NSE 20 share index on its first trading day. 
After calculating this two returns it is now possible to calculate the MAAR for each of 
the stocks IPOs on their first day using: 
MAARtl = ( l+Rn - 1) * 100 (3) 
l+RNSEl 
To calculate the average MAAR for the selected sample the arithmetic average of the first 
abnormal return on all the IPOs was computed. 
Testing for the relevance of the abnormal initial return the study will use test statistics. 
tstatistics = MAARa * ..fii. (5) 
Sd5 
In the above fornmla n is the number of observations within the sample and the Sds is the 
cross sectional standard deviation of the MAAR in the sample. 
3.3.2 Money left on the table. 
The concept was explained earlier on how this is the difference between the closing price 
of the stock on its first day and its initial offer price and then multiplied by the number of 
the shares sold. The IPO activity has been known to result in there being money left on 
the table. 
In order to detennine if there was any money left on the table the study will aim to 
calculate the change in the offer price of the IPO and the first day closing price too. The 
difference between the two will then have to be multiplied by the number of shares sold. 
The result should give us the amow1t left on the table in Kenyan Shillings. 
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3.3.3 Market Adjusted Buy and Hold Return (MABHR) 
The study will also aim to analyze the impact on the investors' wealth if the same amount 
of money will be invested passively in each of the selected IPOs after the first day of 
trading. This can be calculated using by determining the buy and hold return for the 
sample IPOs selected and compare these with the buy and hold return an investor could 
have achieved by investing in the NSE 20 share index. The monthly returns will have to 
be calculated as well. This will be done by comparing the closing price of the stock on 
the last trading day of the month and the closing price at the same point for the previous 
month. The first month allows for underpricing and the possibility of price support in its 
first few days hence this month will be excluded from the calculations. The general 
assumption is that the first month allows for prices to be adjusted downwards moving 
towards the true market equilibrium once the support of the prices has been withdrawn, 
(Khurshed, Mudambi, & Goergen, 1999). 
MABHR is calculated as follows as suggested by Ritter (1991): 
Here the MAHBRi will represent the market adjusted buy and hold retum for a finn i 
over a 60 month period. We choose 61 periods since t=2 because the study aims to 
exclude the first month. Pit will represent the closing price of a stock i at a time t. The 
NSEit will represent the closing index in the relative month. The retums will exclude the 
initial under-pticing. 
The results are interpreted such that a positive MABHR shows that the stock is 
performing better than the benchmark it is pitted against. We can calculate the mean 
MABHR as the arithmetic average of the abnormal retums on all of the IPOs in the 
sample selected. 
The MABHR1po,t represents the average market adjusted buy and hold retum from the 
sample selected within the petiod t. The total sample size is denoted by n. Here the 
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MABHRi will represent the market adjusted buy and hold return for a firm i over a period 
t. 
The study requires the t-statistic for the MABHR for the same reasons stated above for 
the MAAR. 
tstatistics = MABHR1p 0 t * Ft (8) ' Sdt 
The MABHR1po,t represents the average market adjusted buy and hold return from the 
sample selected within the period t. In the above fonnula nt is the number of 
observations within the sample and S dt is the cross sectional standard deviation of the 
MABHR in the sample over a period t. 
In the examinations of long tenn perfmmance it was observed that the IPOs 
outperfonned the stock market benchmarks. It was noted that the divergence widened 
over time in contrast to the patterns observed in what was considered developed markets, 
(Chun, Lynch, & Smith, 2002). 
In order to establish the long lUll performance of IPOs, the mean percentage change of 
the market prices will be calculated for a time period of 5 years from the actual date of 
the IPO. The study will aim to measure the long tenn stock price performance for the 
initial year, the next three years and the fifth year. Tllis method is consistent with that of 
Ibbotson (1975). The mean will be calculated for the year 1-5 using the geometric mean 
method. This seems to be the most preferred method as it can be easily adapted to 
average ratios, logarithmically distributed series and the rate of exchange. The year will 
be defined as twelve, 2i trading day intervals, (Loughran & Ritter, 1995). 
3.3.4 Wealth relative 
To measure secondary market perfmmance a teclmique used by Ritter (1991) and 
Loug!u·an and Ritter (1995) was implemented. Tllis is method is called the wealth 
relatives. 
The perforn1ance of sample IPOs was calculated relative to the market benclm1ark and 
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that is the security to market benchmark wealth relative. 
It is calculated as follows: 
WR= 
1 N 
l+r;: Lt=l Ri,t 
l'<:'N 
1 +n L.t=l RNSE,t 
(9) 
If WR> 1 then it implies that the retum from investing in an IPO is greater than investing 
in the market portfolio however if WR<l then investing in the market portfolio would 
have been more profitable and if WR=l then the investor is indifferent. 
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CHAPTER4 : DATA ANALVSMS 
4. 1 Sample Selection 
As pointed out in the introduction of this paper the IPO issues in Kenya have been far and 
few between the last 15 years. In fact the companies that issued shares that meet our 
criteria are only four companies. 
The selected companies meet the criteria to complete both objectives set forward. The 
table below gives the details of the companies selected: 
Table 1 
Company Shares on Year Of Issue Subscription 
issue Study Price level 
Safari com 2008 June 5 532.00% 
10,000,000 
Co-Operative 2008 October 9.5 81.00% 
701,000,000 
Britam 2011 9 60.00% 
660,000,000 September 
Source: Capital Markets Authorzty 
4.2 First day Performance test 
The table 2 shown below rep011s on the afte1market perfonnance for the 4 selected 
companies. The MAAR calculated for most of the companies are positive for the initial 
day of trading and are significantly greater than zero . There was one case of Britam 
where the retums generated had negative MAAR on the first day of trading. Consistent 
with previous studies and literature review, the results show a large mean of 23 .1 and a 
median of21.32. The data had at statistic of 1.47 at a confidence interval of95%. This 
results are consistent with the findings that showed competitive average first day trading 
retums were found to be 78 .5%, 16.7% and 2.8% in Brazil, Chile and Mexico 
respectively, (Aggarwal, Leal, & Hemandez, 1993). 
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Table 2 
Company Year Of Return on ( 1 + Rt1 ) MAARtl = -1 
Study Stock for the 1 + RNSE1 
first day (Rtl) * 100 
Safaricom 2008 June 0.60 60.00 
Co-Operative 2008 0.05 5.26 
October 
Britam 2011 (0.10) (10 .00) 
September 
Nairobi Securities 2014 0.37 37.37 
exchange September 
4.3 Money Left on the Table 
The table below looks at underp1icing from a different angle. It shows the amount of 
money that was not obtained as a result of the issue being pegged lower than the trading 
p1ice. The results from this study are exceptional. Three out of four of the sample sho:wed 
vast amounts of money left on the table. The one that did not have similar results, Britam, 
had a negative balance meaning they had valued the share at a higher price than the 
market assumed it to be. The largest amount of money left on the table not just in this 
study but even historically in the Nairobi Stock Exchange was that of Safaricom due to 
its highly oversubscribed issues (KES 30 Billion). 
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Table 3 
Company Issue Piice Closing Price Shares on Issue Money left on the table 
A b c d=(b-a)*c 
Safaricom 5 8.00 10,000,000,000 30,000,000,000 
Co-Operative 9.5 10.00 701,000,000 350,500,000 
Britam 9 8.10 660,000,000 (594,000,000) 
Nairobi Securities 9.5 1.05 66,000,000 234,300,000 
Exchange 
4.4 Test of Long run Aftermarket Performance ofiPOs. 
It was shown in the study conducted by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), new issues in the 
USA usually underperform the market in the long run. The same study also showed that 
the mean and median MAAR were negative in cases where investors purchased the 
securities at the offering price and held them for one year. Similar results were obtained 
by Ritter (1990). Aggmwal et, al. (1993) showed that brazil had mean excess returns of 
around -39% with respect to an investor who bought securities at the offering price and 
held them for an year. 
The results shown in Appendix I are that of the MABHRs calculated to determine the 
long term performance. From the data gathered and test conducted the series developed 
shows a mixed result during the period selected. The average cumulative retums fall to 
negative 1.82% after five months of trading (excluding the initial month) . The cumulative 
retums then grow strongly for three months and fall again. At the end of year 1 the 
retums have fallen to a -4.64% and the average cumulative retums for the following years 
were 1.45%, 12.26%, 3.01% and 0.89% for year 2, year 3, year 4 and year 5 respectively. 
We also deduced that the average retums are not statistically significant at a confidence 
interval of 95%. 
What we can deduce from this test is that level ofiPO under performance is mixed and 
not economically and statistically significant. 
To evaluate the t statistic we would not reject the null hypothesis if the t value computed 
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is less than the critical value. In which case the MABHRs for all years after the first show 
positive retums which implies that the IPOs have perfom1ed better than the benchmark. 
This means if I picked a month at random I would have lost as much with an IPO bet as I 
would have in the f·ullmarket trade (or vice versa) 
The study canieci out by Ibbotson (1997) suggests that the level ofunderperfonnance 
will not extend beyond a tlu·ee year period. This study also shows that underperfonnance 
of an IPO does not extend beyond tlu·ee years shown by our cumulative average retums. 
4.5 Wealth relatives 
In order to have a quantitative measure of long term perfonnance of the IPOs some 
benclunark has to be used. The focus this time will be on wealth relatives, , defined as the 
average gross total return on IFOs divided by the average gross total return on NSE20 
index where both of these are measured over the 5 years after the IPO, excluding the 
initial return, as the primary measure of IPO aftennarket perfotmance. The wealth 
relative (WR) after 5 years of seasoning is 1.02. 
Since WR> 1 then it shows that investing in an IPO portfolio would generate higher 
retums than the market portfolio. The study shows that the IPOs outperfotm the market 
during a five year period. The study has shown that Kenyan IPOs do not underperfonn 
the market beyond its first year anniversary post financial crisis. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Summary and conclusions 
The following sections will summmize and conclude the findings and analysis of this 
study: 
5 .1.1 Initial first day returns 
The study carried out supports findings from other IPO markets in the world that initial 
first day rett1ms are economically relevant and statistically significant. The rett1ms were 
found to be on average 23.16 which is a significant amount. The stt1dy also deduced that 
there was a large amount of money left on the table in ~ rds of the IPOs exan1ined. It 
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was only in the case ofBritam Holdings Ltd that the money left on the table was negative 
which implies it was overpriced. However every other IPO was clearly underpriced 
which is consistent with Jumba (2002). 
Evidence from previous studies conducted on IPOs have also always found excess retums 
in the short mn. These retums could be attributed to simply liability avoidance, aspects of 
infotmation asymmetry as no market is complete, the need to award investors for 
willingly taking a risk, and the need to make IPOs of govenunent entities to be spread as 
large as possible during periods of privatization. 
5 .1.2 Long term performance of IPOs 
The average cumulative retums fell to negative 1.82% after five months of trading 
(excluding the initial month) and at the end of year 1 the retums have fallen to a -4.64% 
and the average cumulative retums for the following years were 1.45%, 12.26%, 3.01% 
and 0.89% for year 2, year 3, year 4 and year 5 respectively. The study also shows that 
the average retums were not statistically significant at a 5% level of significance as the t 
values computed were significantly lower than the critical values. 
The overall conclusion is that the market has no pattem when compared against the 
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benchmark. The returns in the last four years were positive but the volatility within the 
returns was extremely high as well. Hence the study concludes that their no visible 
regularity when computed against the market benclm1arks. 
This study goes against the fmdings of Jumba (2002) and Ibbotson et al. (1994) who had 
deduced that the IPOs underperfonn in the long m11. From our study we have deduced 
that the IPOs have petfmmed better than the market in the first year but after the first 
year investing in the market or an IPO portfolio would have almost similar returns as per 
the t-test. 
A significant difference in the methodology used by Jumba (2002) and this study is that 
Jumba used daily data which is more noisy and made modeling difficult. However the 
MAAR used in tlus study has done a significantly better job of explaining the under and 
over perfonnance. 
In order to detennine the strength of the initial tests this study can·ied out I calculated a 
significantly quantitative measure of long mn performance which was the wealth 
relatives. It is defined as the average gross total return on IPOs divided by the average 
gross total return on the market index, where both of these are measured over the 5 years 
after the IPO, excluding the initial return. The wealth relative (WR) after 5 years of 
seasoning is 1.02. Since WR> 1 then it shows that investing in an IPO portfolio would 
generate higher rehnns than the market portfolio. This implies that the IPOs outperfonn 
the market during a five year period. The study has shown that Kenyan IPOs do not 
underperfonn the market beyond its first year anniversary post financial crisis. 
5.2 Limitations 
• The data collected from NSE needs to be more cautiously interpreted due to the 
small sample size and because of the fact that 2-4 of the IPOs were from a single 
year. 
• The study conducted used monthly averages in its calculations. The results may 
vary if daily data was used. 
• Studies conducted on the perfonnance of IPOs in first world economies use 
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matched samples. The results of such studies will have more validity than those 
based on market indices. This method however cmmot be applied in NSE because 
it is difficult to get the finns to pair with the IPO finns. Based on that fact one 
should be cautious in making inadequate comparisons of studies using different 
methods. 
• The period selected conceming the Post financial crisis also had other events that 
may have affected the retums on shares and IPO performance such as the Kenyan 
post-election violence (2007) . 
5.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
This subject has been studied for years and will continue to be studied for years to come 
as more and more infom1ation is made available and markets become more efficient. 
However more attention needs to be drawn to the fact that; 
1. There are many theories out there that to explain the underpricing phenomena. 
Many of the first world countries have settled on a few of these theories however 
the continued research on this phenomena and its reasons of occurrence need to 
occupy the minds of the third world analysts. 
2. The results generated in this study may be as a result of the sample selected and 
data mining methods. More effort is required to detem1ine the authenticity of this 
regularity and to theorize on its roots. 
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Average Cumulative retums 
Date Safaricom NSE20 MABHR CO-
closing compantive Operative 
price closing NSE20 
Date price comparative MABHR 
July-08 November-
5.80 4,868 .27 08 3.58 3,341.47 
August-08 -0 .70% December-
5.50 4,648 .78 08 5.65 3,521.18 40.32% 
September- -0.93% 
08 4.90 4,180.40 January-09 4.76 3,198.90 -7.54% 
October-08 -24.73% Febmary-
3.10 3,386.65 09 3.99 2,474.75 8.02% 
November- 17.68% 
08 3.65 3,341.47 March-09 3.75 2,805.03 -1 8.73% 
1--
December- -6.62% 
08 3.60 3,521.18 April-09 3.63 2,800.10 -3 .08% 
Januaty-09 -2.18% 
3.20 3,198.90 May-09 4.08 2,852.57 9.83% 
Febmary-09 4.90% 
2.60 2,474 .75 June-09 6.19 3,924.56 9.78% 
March-09 1.78% 
3.00 2,805.03 July-09 5.54 3,273.10 7.06% 
April-09 -4.95% 
2.85 2,800.10 August-09 5.33 3,102.68 1.48% 
May-09 -5.43% September-
2.75 2,852.57 09 5.21 3,005.41 0.91 % 
June-09 -16.75% October-




3.70 3,273.10 09 5.39 3,189.55 
August-09 2.61% December-
3.60 3,102.68 09 5.39 3,247.44 -1.80% 
September- 5.93% 
09 3.70 3,005.41 Januaiy-10 5.74 3,565.28 -3.05% 
October-09 3.97% Februmy-
3.95 3,083 .63 10 5.83 3,629.41 -0.23% 
November- 17.15% 
09 4.85 3,189.55 March-IO 5.95 4,057 .63 -9.12% 
·-·---· -
December- -8.18% 
09 4.55 3,247.44 April-10 7.02 4,233.24 12.30% 
Janumy-10 4.97% 
5.25 3,565 .28 May-10 7.53 4,241.81 6.81% 
F ebrua1y-l 0 1.03% 
·5.40 3,629.41 June-10 9.17 4,339.28 17.43% 
March-IO -9.32% 
5.50 4,057 .63 July-10 8.93 4,438.58 -4.91% 
April-10 1.07% 
5.80 4,233 .24 August-10 9.64 4,454.49 7.29% 
May-10 -4.61% September-
5.55 4,241.81 10 10.95 4,629.80 8.88% 
June-10 2.13% October-
5.80 4,339.28 10 11.85 4,659.56 7.26% 
July-10 -2.26% November-
5.80 4,438 .58 10 11 .34 4,395.17 1.44% 
August-10 -18.25% December-
4.85 4,454.49 10 11.37 4,432.60 -0.58% 
September- -12.47% 
10 4.45 4,629.80 January-11 12.05 4,464.92 5.08% 
October-10 7.97% February-
4.85 4,659.56 11 12.20 4,240.18 6.40% 
43 
November- -1 .65% 
10 4.50 4,395.17 March-11 9.85 3,887.07 -12.70% 
December- 3.50% 
10 4.70 4,432.60 April-11 10.71 4,029.23 4.78% 
Janumy-11 -6.19% 
4.45 4,464.92 May-11 10.30 4,078.10 -5.11% 
Februmy-11 -5 .50% 
4.00 4,240.18 June-11 9.61 3,968 .12 -4.20% 
March-11 3.57% 
3.80 3,887.07 .Tuly-11 9.11 3,738.46 0.62% 
April-11 0.28% 
3.95 4,029.23 August-11 · 8.36 3,465.02 -1.00% 
May-11 -3.77% September-
3.85 4,078 .10 11 8.33 3,284.06 5.00% 
June-11 5.30% October-
3.95 3,968.12 11 8.69 3,507.34 -2.35% 
July-11 -4.71% November-
3.55 3,738.46 11 7.05 3,155.46 -10.34% 
August-11 -7.59% December-
3.05 3,465 .02 11 7.41 3,205.02 3.42% 
September- 2.03% 
11 2.95 3,284.06 January-12 7.83 3,224.18 4.92% 
October-11 -4.90% February-
3.00 3,507.34 12 7.08 3,303.75 -12 .51% 
November- 3.67% 
11 2.80 3,155.46 March-12 7.71 3,366.89 6.63% 
December- 5.34% 
11 3.00 3,205.02 Apiil-12 8.12 3,546.66 -0.02% 
January-12 5.86% 
3.20 3,224.18 May-12 7.74 3,650.85 -7.69% 
F ebrumy-12 -5 .61% 
3.10 3,303.75 June-12 8.00 3,703.94 1.86% 
44 
March-12 1.28% 
3.20 3,366.89 July-12 8.18 3,832.42 -1.18% 
April-12 -0.62% 
3.35 3,546.66 August-12 8.29 3,865.76 0.47% 
May-12 -5.93% September-
3.25 3,650.85 12 8.50 3,972.03 -0.21% 
June-12 5.97% October-
3.50 3,703.94 12 9.00 4,143.35 1.49% 
July-12 4.81% November-
3.80 3,832.42 12 8.71 4,083.52 -1.82% 
August-12 0.44% December-
3.85 3,865.76 12 9.11 4,133.02 3.29% 
September- 3.58% 
12 4.10 3,972.03 Januaty-13 9.29 4,416.60 -4.68% 
October-12 2.84% February-
4.40 4,143.35 13 9.93 4,518.59 4.38% 
November- 14.24% 
12 5.00 4,083.52 March-13 11.75 4,860.83 9.53% 
-
December- -1.20% 
12 5.00 4,133.02 April-13 11.61 4,765.23 0.79% 
January-13 1.98% 
5.45 4,416.60 May-13 12.00 5,006.96 -1.64% 
F ebruary-13 3.08% 
5.75 4,518.59 June-13 11.07 4,598.16 0.45% 
March-13 0.23% 
6.20 4,860.83 July-13 11.43 4,787.56 -0.84% 
April-13 12.68% 
6.90 4,765.23 August-13 11 .50 4,697.75 2.50% 
May-13 0.00% September-
7.25 5,006.96 13 11 .57 4,793.20 -1.40% 
June-13 -0.88% October-
6.60 4,598.16 13 12.86 4,992.88 6.49% 
45 
Date Britam NSE20 MABHR Mean 
closing comparative MABHRfor t-statistic 
price all for all 




11 4 .90 3,155.46 11.40% 0.205398 0.435632 
December- 0.46% 
11 5.00 3,205 .02 -2 .67% 0.034912 -0 .24755 
January-12 -6.78% 
4.70 3,224.18 -7.83% 0.133897 -0.37061 
F ebruary-12 -19.82% 
3.95 3,303 .75 -6 .96% 0.174252 -0.28876 
March-12 4.24% 
4.20 3,366.89 -1.82% 0.045228 -0.14797 
April-12 12.23% 
5.00 3,546.66 6.63% 0.063046 0.457211 
46 
May-12 5.72% 
5.45 3,650.85 6.80% 0.021326 0.806751 
June-12 -1.44% 
5.45 3,703.94 2.47% 0.035041 0.228128 
July-12 1.95% 
5.75 3,832.42 -0 .51% 0.031496 -0 .04952 
August-12 0.00% 
5.80 3,865.76 -1.51% 0.027976 -0 .15604 
September- 7.13% 
12 6.40 3,972.03 -4.64% 0.09752 -0.25751 
October-12 -8.21% 
6.15 4,143.35 8.74% 0.174025 0.362943 
November- -1.01% 
12 6.00 4,083.52 -0 .07% 0.019191 -0.00859 
December- -3.74% 
12 5.85 4,133.02 -0.29% 0.044009 -0.02361 
January-13 1.57% 
6.35 4,416.60 1.77% 0.01719 0.233698 
F ebmary-13 7.46% 
7.00 4,518 .59 5.17% 0.108448 0.271677 
March-13 16.71% 
8.90 4,860.83 6.94% 0.108471 0.365144 
Aplil-13 -6.21% 
8.20 4,765 .23 1.86% 0.057518 0.134284 
May-13 -3 .14% 
8.35 5,006.96 5.11% 0.088777 0.297073 
June-13 4.24% 
8.00 4,598.16 -3.33% 0.056451 -0 .24294 




8.35 4,697.75 3.90% 0.060469 0.274867 
September- -5.05% 
13 8.10 4,793.20 1.45% 0.050487 0.111544 
October-13 19.95% 
10.30 4,992.88 6.38% 0.097147 0.354286 
--
November- 29.97% 
13 14.20 5,100.88 3.71% 0.199171 0.144119 
December- 8.28% 
13 14.90 4,926.97 0.30% 0.091209 0.017117 
Janum-y-14 18.77% 
18.10 4,960.99 11 .05% 0.054974 0.815928 
F ebmary-14 2.20% 
18.40 4,933.41 -4.05% 0.063165 -0.27908 
March-14 -0 .80% 
18.30 4,945.78 2.49% 0.023842 0.279829 
April-14 -0.89% 
18.15 4,948.97 -4.06% 0.022885 -0.46519 
May-14 0.54% 
18.00 4,88 1.56 -3.05% 0.025953 -0.32809 
June-14 12.93% 
20.50 4,885.04 5.71 % 0.052506 0.43132 
July-14 13 .23% 
23.50 4,906.09 4.17% 0.064255 0.284959 
August-14 0.54% 
24.75 5,139.39 0.59% 0.035822 0.054031 
September- 33.83% 
14 35.50 5,255.62 12.26% 0.155701 0.538237 
48 
October-14 -26.21% 
27.00 5,194.89 -13.75% 0.091 -0.78976 
November- -0.56% 
14 26.65 5,156.33 -1.57% 0.045505 -0.12783 
December- 12.69% 
14 30.00 5,112.64 6.55% 0.045024 0.534362 
January-15 -8.83% 
28.00 5,212.11 -8.74% 0.031072 -0.85911 
February-IS 0.00% 
29.50 5,491.37 3.43% 0.027128 0.361181 
March-15 -2.49% 
27.50 5,248 .16 0.94% 0.032689 0.090369 
Apiil-15 -17.04% 
22.50 5,091.43 -6.29% 0.093983 -0.35529 
May-15 6.17% 
22.50 4,786.74 0.81% 0.048681 0.063282 
June-15 -10.56% 
20.75 4,906.07 -3.49% 0.051009 -0.26745 
July-15 -11.53% 
16.60 4,404.72 -3 .90% 0.054202 -0.2898 
August-15 5.02% 
16.55 4,176.59 -0.37% 0.044687 -0.03058 
September- 1.57% 
15 16.80 4,173.52 3.01% 0.020905 0.360698 
October-15 2.70% 
16.00 3,868.83 1.90% 0.027675 0.197642 
November- -11.87% 
15 14.75 4,016.18 -2.72% 0.065783 -0.18338 
December- -9.84% -3.65% 0.055256 -0.26861 
49 
15 13.45 4,040.75 
Janum-y-16 -3 .73% 
12.10 3,773.17 1.16% 0.035145 0.107554 
F ebruary-16 -3.16% 
12.00 3,862 .24 6.87% 0.073488 0.438798 
March-16 -13 .13% 
10.85 3,982.09 -4.52% 0.061453 -0 .31551 
Apiil-16 19.68% 
13.30 4,009.26 6.67% 0.093161 0.378639 
May-16 15.32% 
14.80 3,827.80 6.28% 0.064791 0.427417 
June-16 -0.54% 
14.00 3,640.61 -0.38% 0.004516 -0.0984 
July-16 -7.07% 
12.50 3,488 .67 2.71% 0.080655 0.165034 
August-16 -6.72% 
10.65 3,178.83 -2.71% 0.028923 -0 .2757 
September- -2.95% 
16 10.55 3,243.21 0.89% 0.040498 0.076452 
50 
